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Abstract—This paper introduces different views for under-
standing problems and faults with the goal of defining a method
for the formal specification of systems. The idea of Layered
Fault Tolerant Specification (LFTS) is proposed to make the
method extensible to fault tolerant systems. The principle is
layering the specification in different levels, the first one for the
normal behavior and the others for the abnormal. The abnormal
behavior is described in terms of an Error Injector (EI) which
represents a model of the erroneous interference coming from
the environment. This structure has been inspired by the notion
of idealized fault tolerant component but the combination of
LFTS and EI using Rely/Guarantee reasoning to describe their
interaction can be considered as a novel contribution. The
progress toward this method and this way to organize fault
tolerant specifications has been made experimenting on case
studies and an example is presented.
Keywords-Formal Methods, Layered Fault Tolerant Specifi-
cation, Problem Frames, Rely/Guarantee
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a long tradition of approaching Requirements
Engineering (RE) by means of formal or semi-formal tech-
niques. Although ”fuzzy” human skills are involved in the
process of elicitation, analysis and specification - as in
any other human field - still methodology and formalisms
can play an important role [?]. However, the main RE
problem has always been communication. A definition of
communication teaches us that [?]:
“Human communication is a process during which
source individuals initiate messages using con-
ventionalized symbols, nonverbal signs, and con-
textual cues to express meanings by transmitting
information in such a way that the receiving party
constructs similar or parallel understanding or par-
ties toward whom the messages are directed.”
The first thing we have realized in building dependable
software is that it is necessary to build dependable com-
munication between parties that use different languages and
vocabulary. In the above definition you can easily find the
words ”similar or parallel understanding are constructed by
the receiving parties”, but for building dependable systems
matching expectations (and specification) it is not enough
to build a similar or parallel understandings since we want
a more precise mapping between intentions and actions.
Formal methods in system specification look to be an
approachable solution.
Object Oriented Design [?] and Component Computing
[?] are just well known examples of how some rigor and
discipline can improve the final quality of software artifacts
besides the human communication factor. The success of
languages like Java or C# could be interpreted in this
sense, as natural target languages for this way of structuring
thinking and design. It is also true - and it is worth reminding
it - that in many cases it has been the language and the
available tools on the market that forced designers to adopt
object orientation principles, for example, and not vice versa.
This is the clear confirmation that it is always a combination
of conceptual and software tools together that create the right
environment for the success of a discipline.
Semi formal notations like UML [?] helped in creating a
language that can be understood by both specialists and non
specialists, providing different views of the system that can
be negotiated between different stakeholders with different
backgrounds. The power (and thus the limitation of UML)
is the absence of a formal semantics (many attempts can be
found in the literature anyway) and the strong commitment
on a way of reasoning and structuring problems which is
clearly the one disciplined by object orientation. Many other
formal/mathematical notation existed for a long time for
specifying and verifying systems like process algebras (a
short history by Jos Baeten in [?]) or specification languages
like Z (early description in [?]) and B [?]. The Vienna
Development Method (VDM) is maybe one of the first
attempts to establish a Formal Method for the development
of computer systems [?]. A survey on these (and others)
formalisms can be found in [?]. All these notations are very
specific and can be understood only by specialists. The point
about all these formalisms is that they are indeed notations,
formal or semi-formal. Behind each of them there is a way
of structuring thinking that does not offer complete freedom
and thus forces designers to adhere to some discipline. But
still they are not methods in the proper sense, they are indeed
languages.
Contributions of the paper
The goal of this paper is providing a different view for
interpreting problems and faults. The overall result will be
the definition of a method for the specification of systems
that do not run in isolation but in the real, physical world. In
[?] we mainly defined a draft of this approach contributing
with an understanding of what a method is and an analysis
of the desiderata. We then presented our method and its
application to a Train System example. We realized that few
points were still at a draft stage and their explanation still
obscure in some paragraphs. In this paper we will provide
more details instead and a different example. The main
contributions of this work can be considered:
1) A perspective for describing problems in term of static
view and dynamic view and and a discussion on how
to combine them
2) A perspective to describe faults in terms of an Error
Injector representing a model of faults (and consequent
introduction of fault tolerant behavior)
3) The organization of the specification in terms of layers
of Rely Guarantee conditions (LFTS)
4) The experimentation on a small automotive case study
II. AN ANGLE TO SEE PROBLEMS
Our work in this paper focuses especially on [?] where
the original idea of a formal method for the specification
of systems running in the physical world originated. That
paper was full of interesting ideas but still was lacking
of a method in the sense we described in [?] and [?].
Few case studies have been analyzed according to this
philosophy in [?] but still a complete method has not been
reached. For this reason we think now that a more structured
approach is urgent in this area. Thus, the goal of the present
work is improving our understanding of those ideas and
incrementing that contribution putting it in an homogeneous
and uniform way and describing a method featuring the
properties we introduced in [?], with particular attention to
fault tolerance. In figure 1 we report a graphical synthesis of
the Descartes method presented in [?]. This work presents a
method as consisting of a partially ordered set of actions
which need to be performed and then discharged within
a specific causal relationship. The success of one action
determines the following ones. Furthermore, the method has
to be repeatable, possibly by non experts or specialists.
At the moment we have had some progress in this
direction but we still need more work toward a method for
the specification of fault tolerant systems. The basic idea
behind [?] was to specify a system not in isolation but
considering the environment in which it is going to run and
deriving the final specification from a wider system where
assumptions have been understood and formalized as layers
of rely conditions. Here the difference between assumptions
and requirements is crucial, especially when considering the
proper fault tolerance aspects. We could briefly summarize
this philosophy as follows:
• Not specifying the digital system in isolation
Figure 1. The method of science
• Deriving the specification starting from a wider system
in which physical phenomena are measurable
• Assumptions about the physical components can be
recorded as layers of rely-conditions (starting with
stronger assumptions and then weakening when faults
are considered)
Sometimes we have found useful, in the presentation of
these concepts, to use figure 2. This figure allows us to show
how a computer system can be seen from a different angle,
as not consisting of functions performing tasks in isolation
but as relationships (interfaces/contracts) in a wider world
including both the machine and the physical (measurable)
reality. As we will see later, this philosophy has been
inspired by Michael Jackson’s approach to software require-
ments analysis typically called Problem Frames approach
[?]. The Silicon Package is the software running on the
hosting machine. It should be clear that the machine itself
can neither acquire information on the reality around nor
modify it. The machine can only operate trough sensors and
actuators. To better understand this point, we like to use a
similar metaphor about humans where it is easier to realize
that our brain/mind system (our Silicon Package?) cannot
acquire information about the world but it can only do that
through eyes, ears and so on (our sensors). In the same way
it cannot modify the world if not through our arms, voice,
etc (our actuators). So, as we start describing problems in
the real world in terms of what we perceive and what we
do (and not about our brain functioning) it makes sense to
adopt a similar philosophy for computer systems consisting
of sensors and actuators. Around the Silicon Package you
can see a red circle representing the problem world and
green small spheres representing the assumptions that need
to be made regarding it. The arrows and their directions
represent the fact that we want to derive the specification
of the silicon package starting from the wider system. The
way in which we record these assumptions is a topic for the
following sections.
Figure 2. Silicon Package, Problem World and Assumptions
The method, its Steps and its Views
In [?] we analyzed the method introduced in [?] according
to the properties described in [?]. To do that, we recognized
three macroscopic steps:
1) Define boundaries of the systems
2) Expose and record assumptions
3) Derive the specification
Our idea is not committing to a single language/notation
- we want a formal method, not a formal language - so we
will define a general high level approach following these
guidelines and we will suggest reference tools to cope with
these steps. It is worth noting that these are only reference
tools that are suggested to the designers because of a wider
experience regarding them from our side. A formal notation
can be the final product of the method but it still needs to be
not confused with the method itself. In figure 3, these steps
are presented and it is showed how different tools could fit
the method at different stages. We call these notations the
plug-ins since they can be plugged into the steps.
Figure 3. Steps and Reference Tools
Figure 3 is a generic representation of the method where
we want to emphasize the different steps which were not
clearly defined in [?]. The reader will understand that this is
still a simplification of the process. We use the word ”steps”
instead of ”phases” since we do not want to suggest a sort
of linear process which is not always applicable, especially
when coping with fault tolerance (as we will discuss later).
We imagine, in the general case, many iterations between
the different steps. The idea of the method is to ground
the view of the silicon package in the external physical
world. This is the problem world where assumptions about
the physical components outside the computer itself have to
be recorded. Only after this can we derive the specification
for the software that will run inside the computer. A more
precise formalization of the method and the features it has
to exhibit is one of the main contributions of [?]. The reader
is probably realizing that what we are obtaining here is a
method exploiting two different perspectives during the three
steps.
• a static view defining the boundaries of the system and
representing the relationships between phenomena and
domains in it. Our reference tools here are Problem
Diagrams [?].
• a dynamic view representing the interactions between
different processes in the system and able to record
the assumptions. Our mathematical reference tools here
are rely/guarantee conditions [?], [?] which regard the
execution of concurrently executing (and interfering)
processes.
Furthermore we need an approach to consider faulty
behavior. This will be described later in the related section.
The idea behind having two different views is that different
people (or stakeholders) could possibly be interested only in
single aspects of the specification and be able to understand
only one of the possible projections. In this way you can
approach the specification without a full understanding of
every single aspect.
Static View
Michael Jackson is well known for having pioneered,
in the seventies (with Jean-Dominique Warnier and Ken
Orr) the technique for structuring programming basing on
correspondences between data stream structure and program
structure [?]. Jackson’s ideas acquired then the acronym JSP
(Jackson Structured Programming). In his following contri-
bution [?] Jackson extended the scope to systems. Jackson
System Development (JSD) already contained some of the
ideas that made object-oriented program design famous.
In this section we describe our reference tool for repre-
senting the relationships between phenomena and domains
of the system we want to specify using Problem Diagrams
[?]. Context Diagrams and Problem Diagrams are the graph-
ical notations introduced by Michael Jackson (in the time
frame 1995/2001) in his Problem Frames (PF) approach to
software requirements analysis. This approach consists of
a set of concepts for gathering requirements and creating
specifications of software systems. As previously explained,
the new philosophy behind PF is that user requirements are
here seen as being about relationships in the operational
context and not functions that the software system must
perform. It is someway a change of perspective with respect
to other requirements analysis techniques.
The entire PF software specification goal is modifying the
world (the problem environment) through the creation of a
dedicated machine which will be then put into operation
in this world. The machine will then operate bringing the
desired effects. The overall philosophy is that the problem
is located in the world and the solution in the machine. The
most important difference with respect to other requirements
methodologies is the emphasis on describing the environ-
ment and not the machine or its interfaces. Let us consider,
for example, the Use Case approach [?]. What is done here is
specifying the interface, the focus is on the interaction user-
machine. With PF we are pushing our attention beyond the
machine interface, we are looking into the real world. The
problem is there and it is worth starting there. The first two
points of the ideas taken from [?] (not specifying the digital
system in isolation and deriving the specification starting
from a wider system in which physical phenomena are
measurable) can be indeed tracked back, with some further
evolution, to [?]. In this work, we are using PF to develop a
method for specification of systems, i.e. a description of the
machine behavior. But, before doing that, we need to start
understanding the problem.
Context Diagrams
The modeling activity of a system should start using this
kind of diagram in the PF philosophy. By means of it we
are able to identify the boundaries of the system, where a
system is intended as the machine to be designed (software
+ hardware) and its domains with their connections (in terms
of shared phenomena). It is part of what we call a static view
of the system.
Context Diagrams contain an explicit and graphical rep-
resentation of:
• the machine to be built
• the problem domains that are relevant to the problem
• the interface (where the Machine and the application
domain interact)
A domain here is considered to be a part of the world we
are interested in (phenomena, people, events). A domain in-
terface is where domains communicate. It does not represent
data flow or messages but shared phenomena (existing in
both domains). Figure 4 shows a simple scenario. The lines
represent domain interfaces, i.e. where domains overlap and
share phenomena.
Figure 4. Context Diagram
Problem Diagrams
The basic tool for describing a problem is a Problem
Diagram which can be considered a refinement of a Context
Diagrams. This should be the 2nd step of the modeling
process. A problem diagram shows the requirements on the
system, its domains, and their connections. It is still part
of a static view of the system but better represents the
assumptions about the system and its environment. They
are basic tools to describe problems. To the information
contained in context diagrams they add:
• dotted oval for requirements
• dotted lines for requirements references
Figure 5 shows a scenario where the Silicon Package is in
charge of monitoring the patients conditions. We believe that
the first step of the specification method (define boundaries
of the systems) can be accomplished by means of this tools.
Thus we use Problem Diagrams as a reference tool for our
research but still, as said, not constraining it to a specific
notation or language.
Figure 5. Problem Diagram
Dynamic View
Problem Diagrams taken from the PF approach are a
notation that forces us to think about the problem in the
physical world instead of focusing immediately on the
solution. We believe that they represent an effective tool
to define the precise boundaries of the specification we are
working on. Summarizing they represent:
1) the machine
2) the problem domains
3) the domain interfaces
4) the requirements to bring about certain effects in the
problem domains
5) references in the requirements to phenomena in the
problem domains
Once the domains of the context we are working on, their
phenomena and the relative overlap have been understood,
it will be necessary to focus on the ”border” between the
Silicon Package and the real world. It is necessary to distin-
guish between assumptions and requirements and we need
a tool to record assumptions. Our system will be composed
of interacting parts and each of these parts will also interact
with the world. The world itself has to be understood in
term of assumptions about normal/abnormal behavior and a
model of fault need to be considered. For all these reason we
introduce the concept of dynamic view which represents the
interactions between processes in the system and between
the system and the world. To record our assumption (as we
will see layers of assumption for fault tolerance) we use
a mathematical reference tool, i.e. rely/guarantee conditions
[?], [?] which regard the execution of concurrently executing
processes. R/G conditions are a powerful abstraction for
reasoning about interference and they originated in the
Hoare logic idea of preconditions and postcondition [?]. The
purpose is providing a set of logical rules for reasoning
about the correctness of programs. We will explain the
idea through examples, for more details please consider the
literature. As the reader will realize in this section, rely
conditions can be used to record assumptions in the overall
context of the proposed method. However, as stated in [?],
when they show too much complication this might be a
warning indicating a messy interface.
Preconditions and Postcondition
To understand the power of the R/G reasoning it is
necessary to realize how preconditions and postconditions
can help in specifying a software program when interference
does not play its role. What we have to describe (by means
of logical formulas) when following this approach is:
1) the input domain and the output range of the program
2) the precondition, i.e. the predicate that we expect to
be true at the beginning of the execution
3) the postcondition, i.e. the predicate that will be true at
the end of the execution provided that the precondition
holds
Preconditions and postconditions represent a sort of con-
tracts between parties: provided that you (the environment,
the user, another system) can ensure the validity of a certain
condition, the implementation will surely modify the state in
such a way that another known condition holds. There is no
probability here, it is just logic: if this holds that will hold.
And the input-output relation is regulated by a predicate that
any implementation has to satisfy.
We show the example of a very simple program, the
specification of which in the natural language may be: “Find
the smallest element in a set of natural numbers”.
This very simple natural language sentence tells us that
the smallest element has to be found in a set of natural
numbers. So the output of our program has necessarily to
be a natural number. The input domain and the output range
of the program are then easy to describe:
I/O : P(N)→ N
Now, you expect your input to be a set of natural numbers,
but to be able to compute the min such a set has to be non
empty since the min is not defined for empty sets. So the
preconditions that has to hold will be:
P (S) : S 6= ∅
Provided that the input is a set of natural numbers and
it is not empty, the implementation will be able to compute
the min element which is the one satisfying the following:
Q(S, r) : r ∈ S ∧ (∀e ∈ S)(r ≤ e)
Given this set of rules, the input-output relation is given
by the following predicate that needs to be satisfied by any
implementation f :
∀S ∈ P(N)(P (S)⇒ f(S) ∈ N ∧Q(S, f(S)))
Interference
The example just showed summarizes the power (and the
limitations) of this kind of abstractions. To better understand
the limitations consider figure 6 where interference and
global state are depicted. The two processes alternate their
execution and access the state. The global state can consist
of shared variables or can be a queue of messages if message
passing is the paradigm adopted. This figure shows exactly
the situations described in [?], quoting precisely that work:
As soon as the possibility of other programs
(processes) running in parallel is admitted, there
is a danger of ”interference.” Of more interest
are the places where it is required to permit
parallel processes to cooperate by changing and
referencing the same variables. It is then necessary
to show that the interference assumptions of the
parallel processes coexist.
Another quote from [?] says:
The essence of concurrency is interference:
shared-variable programs must be designed so as
to tolerate state changes; communication-based
concurrency shifts the interference to that from
messages. One possible way of specifying inter-
ference is to use rely/guarantee-conditions.
In case we consider interfering processes, we need to
accept that the environment can alter the global state. How-
ever,the idea behind R/G is that we impose these changes to
be constrained. Any state change made by the environment
(other concurrent processes with respect to the one we are
considering) can be assumed to satisfy a condition called R
(rely) and the process under analysis can change its state
only in such a way that observations by other processes will
consist of pairs of states satisfying a condition G (guarantee).
Thus, the process relying on the fact that a given condition
holds can guarantee another specific condition. An example
is now presented.
Figure 6. Interference trough global state
Greatest Common Divisor
Consider the two following simple pieces of code, the co-
operation of which calculates the Greatest Common Divisor:
P1: P2:
while(a<>b){ while(a<>b){
if(a > b) if(b > a)
a := a-b; b := b-a;
} }
P1 is in charge of decrementing a and P2 of decrementing
b. When a = b will evaluate to true it means that one is the
Greatest Common Divisor for a and b. The specification of
the interactions is as follows:
R1 : (a = a) ∧ (a ≥ b⇒ b = b) ∧ (GCD(a, b) = GCD(a, b))
G1 : (b = b) ∧ (a ≤ b⇒ a = a) ∧ (GCD(a, b) = GCD(a, b))
R2 = G1
G2 = R1
Here the values a and b are used instead of a and b when we
want to distinguish between the values before the execution
and the values after. P1 relies on the fact that P2 is not
changing the value of a and a ≥ b means no decrements
for b have been performed. Furthermore the CGD did not
change. Specular situation is for the guarantee condition.
Obviously, what is a guarantee for P1 becomes a rely for
P2 and vice versa.
Need for Extension (of Jackson’s Diagrams)?
The objective of a PF analysis is the decomposition of
a problem into a set of subproblems, where each of these
matches a problem frame. A problem frame is a problem
pattern, i.e the description of a simple and generic problem
for which the solution is already known. There are four main
patterns plus some variations:
• required behavior (the behavior of a part of the physical
world has to be controlled)
• commanded behavior (the behavior of a part of the
physical world has to be controlled in accordance with
commands issued by an operator)
• information display (a part of the physical world states
and behavior is continuously needed)
• simple workpieces (a tool is needed for a user to
create/edit a class of text or graphic objects so that
they can be copied, printed...)
Our perception is that, when describing the behavior of
interfering processes - especially when faults are considered
as a special case of interference (see next section) - the
diagrams and the patterns provided are not powerful enough.
We need further refinement steps filling the gap between the
static and the dynamic view to complete the specification
process. Now we briefly describe these ideas that needs
further work and can be considered an open issue.
Interface Diagram
In a 3rd step of the modeling process, we want to represent
an external, static view of the system. We need a further
refinement of the Problem Diagram able to identify the op-
erations of the system and its domains, and the input/output
data of these operations (with their types). The relationship
of these with the requirements identified in the Problem
Diagram has to be represented at this stage.
Process Diagram
In a 4th step of the modeling process, the whole system is
represented as a sequential process and each of its domains
as a sequential process. Concurrency within the system or
within its domains is modeled by representing these as
two or more subcomponents plus their rely and guarantee
conditions. This is an external, dynamic view of the system
and its domains.
III. AN ANGLE TO SEE FAULTS
Testing can never guarantee that software is correct.
Nevertheless, for specific software features - especially the
ones involving human actions and interactions - rigorous
testing still remains the best choice to build the desired
software. We know very little about human behavior, there
are few works trying to categorize, for example, human
errors in such a way that we can design system that can
prevent bad consequences [?] but this goes far beyond the
scope of this work. Here we want to focus on the goal of
deploying highly reliable software in terms of aspects that
can be quantified (measured), for example the functional
input/output relation (or input/output plus interference, as
we have seen). In this case formal methods and languages
provide some support. The previous sections discussed how
to derive a specification of a system looking at the physical
world in which it is going to run. No mention has been made
of fault tolerance and abnormal situations which deviate
from the basic specification. The reader will soon realize
that the method we have defined does not directly deal
with these issues but it does not prevent fault tolerance
from playing a role. The three steps simply represent what
you have to follow to specify a system and they do not
depend on what you are actually specifying. This allows us
to introduce more considerations and to apply the idea to a
wider class of systems. Usually, in the formal specification
of sequential programs, widening the precondition leads
to make a system more robust. The same can be done
weakening rely conditions. For example, if eliminating a
precondition the system can still satisfy the requirements this
means we are in presence of a more robust system. In this
paper we will follow this approach presenting the notion of
Layered Fault Tolerant Specification (LFTS) and examining
the idea of fault as interference [?], i.e. a different angle to
perceive system faults. Quoting [?]:
The essence of this section is to argue that faults
can be viewed as interference in the same way that
concurrent processes bring about changes beyond
the control of the process whose specification and
design are being considered.
The idea of Layered Fault Tolerant Specification (LFTS)
is now presented in combination with the approach quoted
above making use of rely/guarantee reasoning. The principle
is layering the specification, for the sake of clarity, in (at
least) two different levels, the first one for the normal
behavior and the others (if more than one) for the abnormal.
This approach originated from the notion of idealized fault
tolerant component [?] but the combination of LFTS and
rely guarantee reasoning can be considered one of the main
contributions of this work.
Fault Model
First, when specifying concurrent (interfering) processes,
we need to define which kind of abnormal situations we
are considering. We basically need to define a Fault Model,
i.e.what can go wrong and what cannot. Our specification
will then take into account that the software will run in
an environment when specific things can behave in an
”abnormal” way. There are three main abnormal situations
in which we can incur, they can be considered in both the
shared variables and message passing paradigm:
• Deleting state update: “lost messages”
• Duplicating state update: “duplicated messages”
• Additional state update (malicious): “fake messages
created”
The first one means that a message (or the update of a
shared variable) has been lost, i.e. its effect will not be taken
into account as if it never happened. The second one regards
a situation in which a message has been intentionally sent
once (or a variable update has been done once) but the actual
result is that it has been sent (or performed) twice because
of a faulty interference. The last case is the malicious one,
i.e. it has to be done intentionally (by a human, it cannot
happen only because of hardware, middleware or software
malfunctioning). In this case a fake message (or update) is
created from scratch containing unwanted information.
Our model of fault is represented by a so called Error
Injector (EI). The way in which we use the word here is
different with respect to other literature where Fault Injector
or similar are discussed. Here we only mean a model of
the erroneous behavior of the environment. This behavior
will be limited depending on the number of abnormal cases
we intend to consider and the EI will always play its role
respecting the RG rules we will provide. In the example we
will show in the following we are only considering the first
of the three cases, i.e the Fault Injector is only operating
through lost messages.
A contribution of this work is the organization of the spec-
ification in terms of layers of Rely/Guarantee conditions. In
order to do this we introduce the idea of EI as a model of
the environment and we need to describe how the EI will
behave and how we can limit it. Here a process will rely on
a specific faulty behavior and, given that, will guarantee the
ability to handle these situations. More in detail:
• Rely: the Error Injector (environment) interferes with
the process (changing the global state) respecting his
G (superset of the program’s R) — for example, only
“lost messages” can be handled (next example)
• Guarantee: The process provided this kind of (re-
stricted) interference is able to handle excep-
tional/abnormal (low frequency) situations
All the possibilities of faults in the system are described
in these terms and the specification is organized according
to the LFTS principle we are going to describe.
LFTS: how to organize a clear specification
The main motto for LFTS is: ”Do not put all in the
normal mode”. From the expressiveness point of view, a
monolithic specification can include all the aspects, faulty
and non faulty of a system in the same way as it is not
necessary to organize a program in functions, procedures
or classes. The matter here is pragmatics, we believe that
following the LFTS principles a specification can be more
understandable for all the stakeholders involved.
The specification has to be separated in (at least) two
layers, one for the Normal Mode and one (or more) for the
Abnormal Mode. More specifically:
• Normal mode: an operation usually runs in normal
mode respecting his “interface” with the world deter-
mined by P/Q
• Fault interference: in “low” frequency cases the abnor-
mal mode is “activated” (exception handler, forward
recovery)
Figure 7 shows the organization of a process (dashed
rectangles) in a main part and a recovery handler part where
both interact through the global state with other processes
and the Error Injector (represented by a devil here).
Figure 7. Error Injector
It is worth noting the limitations of this way of operating.
Self error detection and self recovery cannot be addressed
by this model since EI is a representation of the environment
external to the process itself. So faulty behavior due to
internal malfunctioning is not what we want to represent
here.
Example of Specification of Interference
For a better understanding of how we can exploit this
idea of treating faults as extraordinary interference with a
low frequency, we introduce a very simple example. First
we consider an even simpler example without interference,
then we introduce interference to investigate the differences
and how we cope with them.
Increments without Interference: Let us consider the
following piece of code:
C(n):
n’ := n;
while (n’>0){
n’ := n’-1;
count ++
}
return count;
C is a very simple program which decrements its input
while reaching zero. While decrementing the input it incre-
ments a counter with the effect that, at the end, the counter
will obviously reach the original value of the input. The
specification of C in terms of Pre and Post conditions is
given as follows:
I/O : N → N
The input (n) and the output (count) are natural numbers.
The precondition that has to hold is:
P (count) : count = 0
since we expect the counter to be zero at the beginning.
Provided that the input is a natural number and the counter
is zero, the execution will satisfy the following:
Q(n, count) : count = n ∧ n = 0
Without any interference, the specification of C only
requires that the input-output relation satisfy the predicate:
∀a ∈ N(P (a)⇒ C(a) ∈ N ∧Q(a, C(a)))
Increments with Faulty Interference: Let us consider the
same piece of code:
C(n):
n’:= n;
while (n’>0){
n’ := n’-1;
count ++
}
return count;
but running in an environment where the following EI is
also running:
EI(n’):
if (n’>0){
n’ := n’+1;
}
The role of this EI here is to model the deletion of state
updates as in the first of the three cases discussed above. The
specification of C as expressed so far is too simple to be able
to manage this kind of situations. Even if we are not handling
malicious updates, the basic formulation we provided so
far needs to be properly incremented because without any
changes the desired implication cannot be satisfied:
∀a ∈ N(P (a) 6⇒ C(a) ∈ N ∧Q(a, C(a)))
What we have to do is restructure the implementation and
to pass from pre and post conditions to rely/guarantee in the
specification. Let us consider the following modification:
C(n):
n’:= n;
while (n’>0){
if n’+ count = n then {
n’ := n’-1;
count ++
} else {
n’ := n-count-1
}
}
return count;
As the reader will understand what we have done is simply
add a recovery handler and a recovery mode based on the
evaluation of the condition n + count = n which is able
to flag the presence of an unwanted interference (a deletion
of an increment). The recovery block is able to cope with
abnormal situations provided that faults are restricted in
behavior (and that it is known in advance). Thus, provided
that a restricted interference happens the program is still
able to satisfy the post condition (and the specification). The
normal mode here is the simple code:
n’ := n’-1;
count ++
while the recovery handler is
n’ := n-count-1
and, as represented in figure 7, C is running in an
environment which is shared with EI. The specification we
want in this case is different from the previous one and it
is expressed, in terms of R/G conditions, as follows:
RC : (n = n) ∧ (count = count) ∧ (n′ > n
′)
GC : n
′ = n− count − 1
RI = true
GI = n
′ > n′
It is worth noting that there is no rely condition (to
be precise there is one always true) for the Error Injector,
indeed it would not be reasonable to expect that the
processes we are specifying would behave in a way so
as to satisfy the needs of a fault model. Instead, EI is
guaranteeing that it will only increment n′ - it is the case
of having only state update deletion (an increment deletes
a decrement) as pointed out previously. Decided the EI
behavior limitation (and thus decided the fault model) we
can design our specification. From the EI specification
C can rely on the fact that n and count will be never
modified while n’ will be only modified in a specific
way (incremented). Now, with the addition of a layer
in the program and in the specification we are still able
to guarantee an (extended) desired behavior by means
of the GC condition which says that n’ will always be
consistent with the value of count preserving the invariant
n′ = n − count − 1, i.e. the summation of n’ and count
will always be equal to n − 1. This will ensure that the
postcondition count = n ∧ n = 0 will hold at the end like
in the case without interference. This simple example shows
how the LFTS principles can provide a clear specification
(with respect to a monolithic one) ensuring, at the same
time, that a desired postcondition holds.
IV. THE AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE
The progress toward this way of layering specifications
has been made by experimenting few case studies. For
example, the one presented in [?] showed the power of the
LFTS principle when applied to train systems. Instead we
now consider a simplified automotive case study. The Cruise
Control is a system able to automatically control the rate of
motion of a motor vehicle. The driver sets the speed and the
system will take over the throttle of the car to maintain the
same speed. One of the requirements of the cruise control
is to be switched off when an error in the engine speed
sensor is detected. This has to be taken into account in the
specification. We use the CrCt to show how the idea of LFTS
can be applied in (semi)realistic systems (simplifications of
real system for the sake of experimenting with new ideas but
still not mere toy examples). Let us consider the following
ideal piece of CrCt code:
while (target <> current){
delta := smooth(target, current);
result := set_eng(delta);
}
The car speed is acquired in smooth(target,
current) and then a delta is calculated for the car
to have a smooth acceleration (smoothness has to be
determined by experience). The specification of this code in
term of P,Q,R,G is the following (it is expressed in natural
language since we are not giving a mathematical model of
the car here):
• P: target has to be in a given range
• Q: delta is zero and the driver has been comfortable
with the acceleration
• R: the engine is adjusted (smoothly) according to delta
• G: the absolute value of delta is decreasing
The requirement mentioned above is not taken into ac-
count in this ideal piece of code, so in case the speed
acquisition goes wrong the guarantee will not hold and
the absolute value of delta will not be decreased. Indeed,
following the LFTS principle we should organize it in
two layers: a normal mode and an abnormal one (speed
acquisition goes wrong):
while (target <> current){
delta := smooth(target, current);
result := set_eng(delta);
if result <> OK then
switch_off
}
This means adding a weaker layer of conditions for the
“abnormal case” being still able to guarantee “something”.
If speed acquisition goes wrong we do not want to force
the engine following the delta since it would imply asking
for more power when, for example, the car speed is actually
decreasing (maybe an accident is happening or it is just out
of fuel). Switching the engine off we avoid an expensive
engine damage.
V. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
In this work we provided a different view for interpreting
problems and faults and we worked toward an improvement
of the ideas presented in [?]. Our goal was to start an
investigation leading to a method for the formal specification
of systems that do not run in isolation but in the real,
physical world. To accomplish the goal we passed trough
a non trivial number of steps including the discussion in
[?] of the concept of method itself (computer science has a
proliferation of languages but very few methods). Then we
presented how we intend to proceed to represent the static
and the dynamic view of the problem. A section is dedicated
to faults and the following to a case study.
Of course this work is not exhaustive and many aspects
need more investigation. Especially the possibility of having
Jackson’s diagrams extensions working as a bridge between
the static and the dynamic view in the way we described
them. Although a small example of static and dynamic
views is presented in this paper and a way to combine
them idealized, more work is needed in combining them
in a coherent and readable notation. Jackson’ diagrams
extensions are only one of the possible solutions anyway.
Indeed another point we have just sketched here but that
needs more work is about the the plug-ins and how to
permit the practical use of different tools/notation. More
investigation regarding the case studies is also needed.
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